Overview
Armament production and militaristic propaganda were on the rise in the decades before the war. Were the major powers preparing to fight a war "sooner or later"? Was the public swayed by this militaristic fervor? Was war becoming an acceptable "gamble"?
Did the military win over the civilian branches of government in the decision to go to war? What power did war plans yield over political decisions?
Books
War Planning 1914 by ISBN: 9780511642371Publication Date: 2010-01-27This collection of essays in military history reassesses the 1914 war plans of the major European powers in a broad diplomatic, military, and political setting. The book focuses on contingency war planning before 1914 in the different contexts and challenges each state faced as well as into a broad European paradigm. This multi-authorial volume offers a diverse perspective on European war planning, in contrast to many previous accounts focusing on Germany's Schlieffen plan. A chapter is dedicated to the planning activities of each European power: Austria-Hungary, Germany, Russia, France, Great Britain, and Italy.
The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War by ISBN: 0691015953Publication Date: 1997-03-23Herrmann focuses on land-based military power and its influence on international affairs during the series of diplomatic crises that led up to the First World War. Instead of emphasizing the naval arms race, which has been extensively studied before, Herrmann focuses on the land-armaments race in the years leading up to the war and its consequences. The study focuses on how European armies adopted the new weaponry of the twentieth century from 1904 to 1914, including quick-firing artillery, machine guns, motor transport, and aircraft. Hermann argues that land-based military power played a central role in the outbreak of the war; from 1912 onwards, an unprecedented land-armament race was taking place amongst European powers, led by the Russian determination to recover after its defeat in the Russo-Japanese war.
Articles
Stevenson, D. (1997). Militarization and Diplomacy in Europe before 1914. International Security, 22(1), 125–161. https://doi.org/10.2307/2539332
Stevenson explores the role of militarization in European countries and its contribution to escalating tensions before the war. Through his analysis of the military measures used during international crises from 1905 to 1914, he advances that there was a gradual shift to more offensive strategic planning and competitive armaments. According to Stevenson, this sequence of militarizing shocks, rather than single episodes, played a significant role in deteriorating the international situation leading up to World War I. The study focuses on the impact of the Alliance and Entente on diplomacy, as well as the relations between Austria-Hungary and Serbia and the fact that led to the July ultimatum. This reading is a good place to start in searching the dynamic relationship between diplomacy and militarism.
Van Evera, S. (1984). The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War. International Security, 9(1), 58–107. https://doi.org/10.2307/2538636
Van Evera builds his argumentation around the idea that pre-war Europe was seized by the "cult of the offensive," a political and military culture that glorified offensive military strategies and downplayed the advantages of defense. He suggests that despite technological advancements favoring defensive warfare, European leaders believed in the superiority of the offense, leading to a mindset that prioritized quick, decisive victories. Van Evera argues that this belief in offensive dominance influenced military doctrines and decision-making was a contributing factor to the outbreak of the war. This article offers an interesting and focused perspective on one aspect of militarism, instead of focusing on specific war plans or armament schemes, Van Evera studies the European government's overall approach to war and warfare, highlighting similarities in the perspectives of those creating military strategies and policies.
Trachtenberg, M. (1990). The Meaning of Mobilization in 1914. International Security, 15(3), 120–150. https://doi.org/10.2307/2538909
Trachtenberg analyzes the major powers' mobilization plans, arguing that their interconnectedness made war almost inevitable once a nation mobilized. He stressed the impact of military imperatives on political decision-making, which led to unintended consequences. Trachtenberg suggests that it was not simply a matter of statesmen losing control of events, but rather a complex interplay of military imperatives, strategic calculations, and historical circumstances that contributed to the outbreak of World War I. Tachtenberg's article is particularly interesting because, in addition to his study of military plans and strategies, he offers a concluding perspective that situates him between the "inadvertent war" thesis and those supporting the idea of calculated decisions made by elite coteries. His nuanced perspective advances that while statesmen did not lose control of the situation, their decision-making was limited by broader systemic factors.
Turner, L. C. F. (1968). The Russian Mobilization in 1914. Journal of Contemporary History, 3(1), 65–88.
Turner explores the issue of the July mobilizations from the Russian perspective, focusing on the Franco-Russian Military Convention of 1894, which required immediate mobilization by France and Russia in case of a potential attack by Germany or Austria supported by Germany. He also stresses the influence of French assurances on Russian mobilization decisions, particularly through the conduct of the French ambassador in St. Petersburg. The author argues for a more balanced approach to studying the policies of Russia and France in relation to decisions made in Berlin and Vienna by cautioning against concentrating too exclusively on Germany and considering the policies of France and Russia to be simply reactive. This reading balances the widely-held German-centric perspective, established by Fritz Fischer and Immanuel Geiss, that Germany's bellicosity started the European mobilizations.
Wilson, K. M. (1977). To the Western Front: British War Plans and the “Military Entente” with France before the First World War. British Journal of International Studies, 3(2), 151–168.
Wilson explores the nature of the Anglo-French Entente, focusing on its impact on military strategies. Through his analysis of the "Report on the Opening of the War" by the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence, he highlights that despite there being no official "Military Entente" between France and Britain, British military actions were constrained. Coordination between the British and French military staffs had been implemented, which included detailed planning and joint exercises, with the aim to enhance interoperability and cooperation in case of a conflict. Wilson focuses on the ideas put forward by Julian Corbett, a prominent member of the Historical Section, which stated that as a result of the detailed discussions of war plans with France, Britain had entered a binding commitment, motivated by the fact that French would be at risk of defeat without British assistance. This article explores the British perspective of the Entente, which has long been disputed due its informality, from the time of the British government's deliberations regarding their entry in the war. Wilson challenges the popular opinion that Britain had successfully retained its freedom of action and its role as the guardian of the balance of power on the continent, suggesting on the contrary that her pre-war foreign policy and military planners had committed Britain to supporting France, beyond a "moral" Entente.