IST 605: WWI Origins

The authors position themselves against the arguments of the alliance systems, of an accident or "slide," or of mass demands focusing on nationalism, militarism, and social Darwinism. Instead, they focus on the decision-making of small coteries, principally in Austria-Hungary, Germany, Russia, France, and Britain, and how their heir backgrounds, training, and unique agendas impacted the choices made, which led to the outbreak of the war. Chapter 2 also offers a concise analysis of the wars in Europe between 1815 and 1913. In chapters 14 and 15, the editors, Hamilton and Herwig offer their own perspectives regarding the origins of the conflict in two compelling essays.

Berghahn's analysis focuses on Germany in the years immediately preceding the First World War, he advances that Berlin's decision-making was guided by the pursuit of an ambitious plan to secure a prestigious place for Germany in the Europe of the 20th century. He argues that Germany was seeing the rapid diversification of its society and its political system was struggling to resolve contemporary social, economic, and cultural problems. As a result, war was a way for the ruling elite to escape the paralysis of domestic politics. Berghahn positions himself among the historians who favor the "primacy of domestic politics" thesis, according to which domestic affairs or internal political considerations take precedence over external or international concerns in a country's decision-making processes.

Lieven's analysis focuses on Russia, aiming to explain St. Petersburg's fateful decision to go to war by exploring the world of the men who made it. Looking at the origins of the First World War from a mostly Russian angle, Lieven explores domestic politics, the emergence of the Triple Entente, and Russia's involvement in the international clashes between 1909 and 1913. The study is centered on the inner workings of Russia's autocratic regime; Lieven analyzes the aristocratic cast and its value system, highlighting the role of empire in the aristocratic national identity. Lieven argues that the geopolitical tensions in Eastern Europe and the enmity towards the "Germanic Powers" were fueled by the nationalist and imperialist mentalities of Russia's political elite.

Sean McMeekin rejects the standard notions of the war's beginning as either a Germano-Austrian preemptive strike or a "tragedy of miscalculation." Instead, he proposes that the key to the outbreak of violence lies in St. Petersburg. He argues that it was Russian statesmen who unleashed the war through conscious policy decisions based on imperial ambitions in the Near East. McMeekin suggests that Russian imperial ambitions prevented the localization of the war to Austro-Serbian territories. His study offers another compelling perspective on the Russian origins of the war, and it is interesting to compare his analysis of Russian politics and decision-making with that of Dominic Lieven. While both historians advance that decisions in Russia were not simply a reaction to those in Germany, and that bellicose intentions were expressed in St. Petersburg as well, the question remains: Was Russia pursuing a conscious, united foreign policy that led down the path of war against Austria-Hungary and Germany? McMeekin's verdict on Russia's "war blame" is clear. However, Lieven's is more nuanced, highlighting how competing ideas guided a dysfunctional political system.

Steiner and Neilson argue that Britain went to war in 1914 not as a result of internal pressures but as a response to external events, rejecting arguments that Britain became involved because of fears of an 'invented' German menace, or to defend her Empire. They emphasize on the role of Russia, advancing that Britain entered the war in order to preserve the European balance of power and its favorable position within it. What makes this a particularly valuable resource is that it considers bureaucratic, diplomatic, economic, strategical and ideological factors that led to Britain's entry into the Great War. This is a seminal work and it is worth consulting when researching the British involvement in the war as it is often cited in the literature.

Williamson argues that Austria-Hungary and not Germany made the crucial decisions for war in the summer of 1914. He traces the gradual militarization of Austro-Hungarian foreign policy following the Balkan Wars and Russia's increasingly assertive policy in Eastern Europe. The first five chapters offer a detailed study of the evolving international scene and Austria-Hungary's role within it, its allies and enemies. Two comprehensive chapters are dedicated to each of the Balkan Wars and their impact on Austro-Hungarian diplomacy. The last chapter follows the decisions made in Vienna during the July crisis, which Williamson determines as more fateful than the ones made in Berlin. His analysis is focused on the unique linkages between domestic and foreign policy in Austria-Hungary, a dual monarchy ruling eleven nationalities. Williamson aligns his argumentation with the idea of "primacy of domestic policies," demonstrating how almost every foreign policy issue faced by Habsburg statesmen was linked to domestic concerns, resulting in decisions being guided by fears of imperial disintegration and the demise of the Habsburg dynasty.

Keiger explores French domestic and international politics from the late 19th century to the outbreak of the war and offers a detailed analysis of the origins and operation of the Franco-Russian alliance. He explains that although its nature was defensive, aiming to remediate France's sense of diplomatic isolation, from 1905 to 1912, it gradually became the prism through which all diplomatic issues were considered, which contributed to the division of Europe into two power blocs. Raymond Poincaré, an eminent politician, premier in 1912 and president in 1913, is a central figure in Keiger's narrative, highlighting his strong hold on French diplomacy, his inflexibility towards Germany, and his desire to keep Berlin at arm's length through a strong and united Entente. Keiger also presents a step-by-step account of France's position, actions, and decisions during the July crisis, including Poincaré's visit to St. Petersburg, the confusion his absence caused on policy in Paris, the influence of the French ambassador on Russian decisions, and the "union nationale" spirit in France as the war approached.